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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

DONALD J. JAMISON, SR.,
et al.,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.

Case No.
14523

UTAH HOME FIRE INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Defendant and Appellant.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

NATURE OF THE CASE
Respondent, Donald Jamison, Jr., was injured in an
automobile accident and sought to recover $12.00 per day in
lieu of reimbursement for expenses for services, together with
attorneys fees, interest and costs, from the Insurance
Company, Utah Home Fire, under Utah's No-Fault Law.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Trial Judge, Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Jr.,
found in favor of Plaintiff and awarded $12.00 per day for

112 days, from November 19, 1974, to March 11, 1975, the
period of disability of Plaintiff, totalling $1,344.00.
In addition, the Trial Court allowed $4 75.00 as attorneys
fees, interest at 18% per annum on the $1,344.00 commencing
from May 22, 1975 until paid, and costs of Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In addition to the facts stated by counsel for appellant, it should be noted that Plaintiff, Donald Jamison, Jr.,
by reason of the accident and injuries bringing him within
Utah's No-Fault Law, was unable to perform his usual household duties and services for a period of 112 days, November
19, 1974, to March 11, 1975 (R - 23).

Furthermore, demands

were made upon Defendant through their agent, to pay the
benefits under the No-Fault Law and a form, provided by
Defendant's agent, was submitted by Plaintiff on Apri] 16,
1975 (R - 16), and more than 35 days elapsed before any benefits were paid to Plaintiff, but no benefits have been paid
to date involving the "Disability benefits" referred to
under the statute 31-41-6 (b) (ii) .
Certain medical benefits were paid by Defendant company
for Plaintiff by the middle of June, 19 75, and a stipulation
was entered into reserving Plaintiff's rights as to the $12.00
per day, attorneys fees and interest issues under the NoFault laws.

(Exhibit 3)
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At the trial it was further stipulated that the
failure to pay the disability benefits C$12,00 per day) by
Defendant is part of the claim, or benefits, referred to in
31-41-8 of the act for which interest and attorneys fees
may be applicable.

(R 6-8)

Also, counsel for Plaintiff performed considerable
legal services in this case, the reasonable value of which
does not seem to be in dispute,

(R-41-42)

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY INTERPRETED SECTION
31-41-6 (b)(ii) IN ALLOWING $12.00 PER DAY TO
PLAINTIFF IN LIEU OF REIMBURSEMENT FOR EXPENSES
FOR SERVICES, UNDER THE UTAH AUTOMOBILE NOFAULT INSURANCE ACT.
The Respondents could not better submit an argument
against Appellant's Point I than to quote the studied and
well reasoned comments of Judge Stewart M. Hanson, Jr.
following submission of the case for the Court's decision,
beginning at Page 44 of the record# Judge Hanson reasoned
as follows:
"THE COURT: Of course, in the State of Utah
we do not have a legislative history such as the
Congressional Record or the laws and record of
jproceedings that Congress has, so we don't always
have the best information as to what the Legislature had in mind when it enacted any particular
provision. But I'm sure that if there is anything that is clear from the legislative history
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from the no-fault legislation, it is first of
all and foremost of all that it was not insurance provisions, but rather, it was the insurance carriers who were pushing that, and this
was done with the representation that in the
long haul the costs of insurance would be considerably less and that this would be in the
interest of Utah. It may not have turned out
exactly that way, but that was the original
intent, I am sure, when the insurance carriers
were lobbying for this particular legislation.
Now, the effect of this legislation is really
reflected in Section 31-41-9 which says, 'No
person for whom direct benefit coverage is
provided for in this Act shall be allowed to
maintain a cause of action for general damages
arising out of personal injuries alleged to have
been caused by an automobile accident, except
where there has been caused by this accident any
one or more of the following: death, dismemberment, or fracture, permanent disability, permanent disfigurement, or medical expenses to a person
in excess of $500.'
Now, apparently there is no claim that the
injuries that were sustained here fall without
the nc-fault coverage, so we then look to the nofault provisions to see what type of coverage was
contemplated by the Legislature in lieu of
general damages or damages of a general nature.
First of all will be medical benefits not
to exceed $2,000.
The second type of coverage — and I am not
taking these necessarily in order — would be funeral, burial benefits not to exceed $1*000, survivor benefits to compensate survivors or heirs
in the sum of $2,000.
Then finally, disability benefits of two
types: one relating to a loss of gross income
described in terms of 85 percent for up to 52
weeks, and thereafter not to exceed $150 per week
based upon inability to work; the second type of
disability benefit talks in terms that have been
discussed by counsel as "in lieu of" reimbursement for expenses, which would have been reasonably
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incurred for services that but for the injury
insured insured person would have performed
for his household, and regardless of whether
any of these expenses are actually incurred.
And of course that is the problem that we are
dealing with here.
The Legislature also talked in terms of
minimum benefits and this, of course, referred
to insurance policies containing at least this
minimum coverage that we just talked about. I
take it that it was contemplated that one could
acquire insurance policies that would provide
for greater benefits, but that no no-fault coverage could have less than this, and I think -chat
is what the word 'minimum" meant, so it wasn't
in terms that someone is entitled to more than
is set forth in this, unless the insurance policy
provides for more than is set forth in 31-41-6.
Now, when the Legislature took away the gen-r
eral right, the common law right of an injured
person to recover general damages, the question
then arises: What did they intend to give in
lieu thereof? What were they intending to take
away? Everything? Or were they intending to
somewhat fix the risk that an insurance carrier
would have to have in this type of situation, that
is, were they not attempting to do something
similar to Workmen's Compensation so that the
insurance carrier could say, "We look at this
particular injury and we know under our policy
that we will have no more than $2,000 plus 85
percent of the lost gross income if a person is
working" — and in this case the person wasn't
working, so they could exclude that $2,000 medical and $12 x 365, or the sum of approximately
$4,000 there, and funeral benefits and survivor
benefits didn't apply here — so the insurance
company knew that its reserves for this type of
injury would have to be something in the neighborhood of $6,000 as opposed to the former situation
where they had to hold out reserves based upon a
prayer in a Complaint of maybe 30 or 40 thousand
dollars. Of course, the reserves problem has
plagued the insurance companies all along. We see
this particularly in medical malpractice. So it
was legislation that was directed toward giving the
insurance carrier some certainty as to the amount
of risk that they would have to bear.
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Now, with that general discussion we look,
then, at the situation here. There's no doubt
about the fact that dealing with a 12-year-old
boy, and I suppose that there would be no dispute
if we were dealing with a 32-year-old housewife
that the housewife would be entitled to $12 reimbursement for that period of time which she would
be unable to perform services. The Legislature
talks about the services that an injured person
would have performed for his household. And in
defining 'person1 in 31-41-3, the Legislature
didn't feel it was important to define 'person'
in any other way than to say 'person includes
every natural person, firm, partnership, association, corporation, or any governmental entity,
or agency of it.' So it includes everything,
everything and everyone. There was no exclusion
as to what 'person' meant. And I take it by that
that there was no exclusion as to what 'injured
person' meant.
The question then resolves itself since the
Legislature did not intend to limit who the injured person was who had performed services for
his household, that they did not intend to limit
it to 32-year-old housewives or exclude a 32-yearold husband who also performed chores around the
house, or a 12-year-old boy who likewise performs
services, even though they may have some additional
purposes such as training him in the useful art
of performing chores around the house.
So I find that the Legislature intended this
provision to be somewhat of a Workmen's Compensation like provision to provide a reparation on
some certain basis for anyone who is injured, who
the evidence shows performed household services.
Nov/, also, they did not intend or attempt to
describe what they meant by 'household services'
or what the extent of those services would be, and
I suppose that if you had a factual situation where
the husband does the dishes, gets the kids ready
for school, makes the beds, cooks the meals, and
does the housekeeping, that an injured 32-year-old
housev/ife would be excluded. J don't thing that
they intended that. So the fact that a minimal
or nominal amount of service is provided by a
12-year-old boy, I think the Legislature intended
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that this be covered. And I find that based
upon the testimony, he did provide household
services and that during a period of time he
was unable to perform those because of his
injuries."
No doubt the legislature put the "allowance of $12.00
per day" for household services "whether any of these expenses are actually incurred" so there would be no quibling
about what those services are worth.

If this were a house-

wife involved, rather than young man, and she had to hire
someone to perform her household services it would cost
from $30.00 to $50.00 a day.

So if the shoe were on the

other foot and she actually paid $30.00 a day to have her
household services performed, would appellants be willing to
pay the actual expense?

Of course they wouldn't.

So Appell-

ant's argument, it would seem, is asking the Court to construe
the $12.00 as the maximum but not the minimum it is liable for.
There is only one construction that can be drawn from
the statue, and that is for any loss of service "in lieu of
reimbursement regardless whether any of these expenses are
actually incurred," the allowance shall be $12*00 a day,
Yourg Jamison did perform housahold services thrt he
waii prevented from doing because of the injuries.

He took

out the garbage, cleaned his room, washed dishes, vacuumed
carpets, helped with the groceries- washed the ccr and was
available to help cut wherever needed as a son.

It is enough

under 31-41-6 (b)(ii) that he performed services, prior tc
the injuries, and further than that is not material in this case.
-7-

POINT IT,
TI7^ TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY ALLOWED ATTORNEYS
FEES, INTEREST, AND COSTS IN THE CASE.
Inasmuch as the attorneys for the parties hereto
stipulated with the Court that if Plaintiff were entitled
to an allowance of $12,00 per day "in Ilea of reimbursement
for expenses/1 then it was understood and agreed that such
claim, or disability benefit under 31-41-6 (b)(ii) came
within 31-41-8 of the Act and would be applicable as covering the issue of interest and attorneys fees in that section,
(R-5-8)
Counsel for Appellant argues in his brief, however,
that the section is not applicable here because no reasonable
proof was offered of the expenses incurred for the services
which the injured Jamison boy would have performed.
It appears obvious that the wording of Section 31-41-8
to-wit:

"after the insurer receives reasonable proof of the

fact and amount of expenses incurred during the period/1
refers to actual expenses incurred, such as the medical expenses, funeral and burial expenses, etc. mentioned under
31-41-6.

No actual expenses were incurred by Plaintiff in

connection with his services and none were required under the
Act for the $12.00 per day is "in lieu of reimbursement for
expenses" and also "regardless of whether any of these
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expenses are actually incurred,"
Thus, when demand was made upon the Defendant insurance company to pay the benefits under the act, which was
done by April 16, 1976 (R.15), by filing the Proof of Claim
form provided by the insurance company themselves, said
Defendant company was provided all the facts and proof needed
or required.

There was nowhere on the form reference to

the $12.00 per day matter, but demands had been made and refused, finally resulting in the Complaint, filed on June 6,
1976, setting forth the S12.00 per day issue.
This Court is also referred to Judge Stevert Hanson
Jrfs comments and reasoning on this issue for they are very
germane.

See pages 50 and 51 of the Record.
POINT III.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR TN ALLOWING 18% PER
ANNUM INTEREST ON THE AMOUNT FOUND DUE UNDER
THE ACT.
Section 31-41-8 provides among other things:
"The person entitled to such benefits may
bring an action in contract to recover these
expenses plus the applicable interest."
First, what is the applicable interest?
per month an stated in the same section.

It is 1 1/2%

In other words,

the action in contract is for 1 1/2% interest per month.
When the Respondent has a right of action in contract under
the Statute it is the same as if Appellant had agreed in
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contract to pay said expenses which shall draw 1 1/2% per
month interest.
Appellants are taking a wrong construction of section
15-1-4 when counsel states that the 18% interest: called
for in 31-41-8 Monly applies until the Court judgment is
rendered."

Let us analyze it further.

The section says

"Any judgment rendered on a lawful contract shall conform
thereto and shall bear the interest agreed upon by the parties, which shall be specified in the judgment."

In other

words this is a judgment, a lawful contract made GO by statute
and it was specified in the judgment.

How could the language

be plainer?
It is not material here what other jurisdictions may
have decided.

Our statute, 15-1-4, has made it clear what

Utah law is in this respect.
POINT IV.
RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED ADDITIONAL ATTORNEYS FEES
AND COSTS IN ARGUING THIS APPEAL.
By reason of the fact that Plaintiffs and Respondents
have been required to pay additional attorneys fees in the
sum of $400.00 in appealing these issues to the Supreme
Court of the State of Utah, it is submitted to this Court
that Plaintiffs should be entitled to reimbursement of these
attorneys fees and costs, also as a part of section 31-41-8,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended.
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CONCLUSION
The Trial Court's decision, allowing the $12.00 per
day for 112 days to Plaintiff under 31-41-6 (b)(ii) of
Utah's No-Fault Insurance Act, and the decision allowing
attorneys fees and interest under 31-41-3 of the Act
should be affirmed, together with costs and additional
attorneys fees for this appeal.
DATED this r)^f day of June, 1976.
Respectfully submitted,

GAYLEN S. YWJNG, JR.
Attorney for Plaintiff and Respondent
2188 Highland Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct
copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT'S BRIEF this £)£{
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June, 19 76, to L. L. Summerhays, attorney for DefendantAppellant, at 604 Boston Building, Salt Lake City,
Utah

84111.
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